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SECURITY SCANNERS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
Gregory S. McNeal
† 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this article, I will take a comparative look at regulations gov-
erning the use of airport full-body security scanners.  A comparative 
look is valuable because the use of scanners, while controversial, is 
not solely an American phenomenon.  In fact, the European Union 
(EU) analyzed the implementation of security scanners and placed 
regulatory controls on their use before the controversy in the United 
States erupted.  This essay proceeds in two parts.  In Part I, I explain 
the EU regulations governing the use of security scanners.  In Part II, I 
present an overview of relevant U.S. laws governing the use of securi-
ty scanners and demonstrate the similarity between the challenges and 
solutions implemented under the European and U.S. fielding of secu-
rity scanners.  I conclude by arguing that the concerns raised by secu-
rity scanners can be sufficiently mitigated with advanced technology 
that maximizes the interest in security while also protecting individual 
liberty. 
Prior to discussing the law dealing with security scanners, it is 
necessary to provide some background on the plots which prompted 
their implementation.  In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, governments around the world rushed to address the 
strategic vulnerabilities, particularly in intelligence and aviation, made 
so apparent on that fateful day.  A massive effort ensued in the United 
States to reorganize the infrastructure and increase the ability of gov-
ernment to prevent another terrorist attack.  The flow of resources to 
executive agencies was dramatically increased under the assumption 
that it would enhance their operational capabilities.  The United States 
was not alone in these efforts.  Europe, Canada, and other nations 
around the world took note of the devastation caused by only nineteen 
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hijackers and took steps to restructure civil aviation security stand-
ards.  Despite these efforts, the chief concern for politicians, intelli-
gence, and security officials became not if, but when and how severe 
the next terrorist strike would be.  
Since September 11,
 
2001, al-Qaeda and its off-shoots have 
evolved, changing their tactics in response to U.S. and European secu-
rity practices.  While al-Qaeda took enormous pride in its ability to 
successfully carry out the 9/11 attacks,
1
 it also knew that such an op-
portunity would not remain available for very long, especially after 
security measures on civilian aircraft changed to prevent terrorists 
from taking control of the cockpit.  Nevertheless, al-Qaeda and asso-
ciated terrorist groups retained their obsession with exploiting the 
vulnerabilities unique to civil aviation.  Instead of aiming to take con-
trol of airplanes and use them as weapons, al-Qaeda realized it could 
instill fear by detonating bombs onboard civilian airplanes while in 
flight.  On December 22, 2001, Richard Reid (popularly known as the 
“Shoe Bomber”), attempted to detonate explosives concealed in his 
shoe while on board American Airlines Flight 63.
2
  In 2006, British 
law enforcement uncovered a plot to detonate liquid explosives that 
were to be carried on board seven transatlantic flights travelling from 
the U.K. to the United States and Canada.
3
  These two plots stick out 
in the minds of many air travelers because the attempts prompted se-
curity authorities to require passengers to remove their shoes at 
checkpoints and institute the 3-1-1 liquid and gel policy.
4
 
There have been several foiled attempts in the past decade; how-
ever, two attempts in particular drew special attention from intelli-
gence and security officials.  Both plots were ultimately traced back to 
a group that many intelligence officials now believe constitutes the 
  
 1 See, e.g., LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER: AL-QAEDA AND THE 
ROAD TO 9/11 358 (2006) (“The accomplishment of striking the two towers was an 
overwhelming signal of God’s favor . . . .”); Mike Boettcher, Detainees Reveal bin 
Laden’s Reaction to Attacks, CNN.COM (Sept. 10, 2002), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2002-09-10/us/ar911.osama.exclusive_1_bin-terrorist-leader-
khalid-shaikh-mohammed (recounting bin Laden’s behavior while events unfolded, 
which included him weeping, praying, telling his followers to “‘Be patient,’” and 
holding up two, three, then four fingers before each subsequent plane crash). 
 2 Michael Elliott, The Shoe Bomber’s World, TIME, Feb. 25, 2002, at 46, 46. 
 3 John Ward Anderson & Karen DeYoung, Plot to Bomb U.S.-Bound Jets Is 
Foiled, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2006, at A1, A11. 
 4 See Make Your Trip Better Using 3-1-1, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., 
http://www.tsa.gov/311/index.shtm (last visited Jan. 4, 2012); Sheldon H. Jacobson, 
Watching Through the “I”s of Aviation Security, 5 J. TRANSP. SECURITY 35 (2012). 
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greatest terrorist threat to the United States, and civil aviation in par-
ticular: al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
5
   
The first notable attempt was the assassination plot by Abdullah 
Hasan al-Asiri against Saudi Arabian Prince and Chief of counterter-
rorism Mohammed bin Nayef.
6
  Al-Asiri detonated a carefully con-
cealed explosive device that tore the terrorist operative’s body into 
seventy pieces.
7
  Questions about the assassination attempt quickly 
mounted.  How was al-Asiri able to get a bomb so close to such an 
important member of the Saudi family—the chief of counterterrorism 
no less?  Al-Asiri had been searched several times, he had spent 24 
hours with the prince’s guards, and had even flown on the prince’s 
aircraft.
8
  Less than four months later, on December 25, 2009, a twen-
ty-three year old Nigerian man named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab 
(commonly known as the “Christmas Day Bomber” or the “Under-
wear Bomber”) boarded Northwest Airlines Flight 253 en route from 
Amsterdam to Detroit.
9
  As the flight was approaching Detroit, Ab-
dulmutallab went to the bathroom where he remained for approxi-
  
 5 See Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), NAT’L 
COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/aqap.html (last visited 
Jan. 4, 2012); Jonathan Masters, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-
arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369 (“President Barack Obama has described AQAP as ‘al-
Qaeda’s most active operational affiliate,’ echoing an acknowledgment from U.S. 
counterterrorism officials that the threat from AQAP has supplanted that of the al-
Qaeda core.”); FRANK J. CILLUFFO & CLINTON WATTS, HOMELAND SEC. POLICY INST., 
YEMEN & AL QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA: EXPLOITING A WINDOW OF 
COUNTERTERRORISM OPPORTUNITY (June 24, 2011), 
http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/issuebrief_yemenaqap.pdf (“The Foreign 
Operations Unit’s special knowledge of the U.S. and unique destructive capabilities 
make AQAP an immediate threat to the U.S.”); see generally SAMUEL LINDO, 
MICHAEL SCHODER & TYLER JONES, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., AL QAEDA IN 
THE ARABIAN PENINSULA (July 2011), available at 
http://csis.org/files/publication/110722_Lindo_AQAP_AQAMCaseStudy3.pdf 
(describing past and future threats of AQAP). 
 6 See Michael Slackman, Would-Be Killer Linked to Al Qaeda, Saudis Say, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2009, at A9; David Gardner, Air Passengers Face Full Body X-
rays After Suicide Bombers Hide Devices INSIDE Their Bodies, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 8, 
2009) http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1218562/Bombers-hide-devices-
inside-bodies-Travellers-Europe-face-body-X-rays.html. 
 7 See Gardner, supra note 6. 
 8 See id. 
 9 See Mark Hosenball, The Radicalization of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 
NEWSWEEK (Jan. 1, 2010, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/01/01/the-radicalization-of-umar-
farouk-abdulmutallab.html; From Shoes to Soft Drinks to Underpants: The Attempted 
Bombing of an Airliner Highlights Gaps in Intelligence-Sharing and Airport Security, 
ECONOMIST, Jan. 2, 2010, at 21, 21 [hereinafter From Shoes to Soft Drinks]. 
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mately twenty minutes.
10
  After returning to his seat with a blanket 
covering his midsection, passengers sitting nearby began to hear pop-
ping noises and watched as Abdulmutallab’s leg caught fire.11  A pas-
senger who was sitting close by managed to subdue Abdulmutallab 
while flight attendants used fire extinguishers to put out the flames.
12
  
It was revealed shortly thereafter that Abdulmutallab had attempted to 
detonate a six-inch package of PETN
13
 and triacetone triperoxide 
(TAPN) that had been sewn into his underwear.
14
  It was also revealed 
through his confession that he had been trained and directed by 
AQAP, which subsequently claimed credit for the attempt.
15
   
Both attempts originated in Yemen, the headquarters of AQAP.  
Both attempts utilized the explosive powder, PETN.  Most important-
ly however, both attempts concealed explosive devices in such a way 
that standard search practices, by hand or by metal detector, would not 
reveal their presence.  For this reason, these two attempts had a major 
impact on intelligence and security officials.  Although TSA officials 
were already exploring the use of X-ray systems at security check-
points, these attempts prompted policymakers to expedite the process 
of deploying such technology to airports across the United States, 
Europe, and Canada.  It is in the context of these types of plots that 
government officials are analyzing the use of security scanners.   
 
I. EUROPEAN UNION REGULATIONS 
 
After 9/11, the EU took steps to review and reorganize aviation 
policies and procedures into a common aviation security framework 
for EU member states.  The European Parliament and Council insti-
  
 10 See Hosenball, supra note 9. 
 11 See id.; From Shoes to Soft Drinks, supra note 9, at 21; Kenneth Chang, 
Explosive on Flight 253 Is Among Most Powerful, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2009, at A14. 
 12 See Hosenball, supra note 9; From Shoes to Soft Drinks, supra note 9, at 
21. 
 13 See generally Malcolm W. Browne, Readily Available, PETN Is Easily 
Molded and Hidden, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1996, at B6 (providing information on 
accessibility and use of PETN). 
 14 See From Shoes to Soft Drinks, supra note 9, at 21; Aliyah Shahid, What is 
PETN? US-Bound Packages Contained the Explosive, Similar to Christmas Day 
Underwear Bomber, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 30, 2010) 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2010-10-30/news/27079712_1_suspicious-packages-
petn-semtex; Indictment at 2, United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 2:10-cr-20005 
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2010), 2010 WL 229849. 
 15 See Hosenball, supra note 9; Anahad O’Connor & Eric Schmitt, Terror 
Attempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite Device on Jet, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2009) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/26/us/26plane.html; From Shoes to Soft Drinks, 
supra note 9, at 21. 
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tuted Regulation (EC) 2320/2002, which was among the first of such 
measures to establish basic security standards for civil aviation com-
mon to all EU member states in order to prevent “acts of unlawful 
interference.”16  Regulation (EC) 300/2008 has since superseded Reg-
ulation (EC) 2320/2002;
17
 however, the provisions regarding passen-
ger screening have remained largely unchanged.  The opening provi-
sion of Regulation 2320/2002 proclaimed that, “[t]he criminal acts 
committed in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 show 
that terrorism is one of the greatest threats to the ideals of democracy 
and freedom and the values of peace, which are the very essence of 
the European Union.”18 
The minimal standards required by the regulation are rooted in the 
security provisions set forth in Annex 17 of the Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation.
19
  The International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (ICAO), a United Nations agency tasked with regulating interna-
tional air travel, first outlined international aviation standards in the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, which was signed by fif-
ty-two nations at the Chicago Convention on December 7, 1944.
20
  In 
March 1974, the ICAO adopted Standards and Recommended Prac-
tices for international civil aviation, which were designated as Annex 
17 of the Chicago Convention.
21
  Although there have been eight sub-
  
 16 Council Regulation 2320/2002, art. 1, 2002 O.J. (L 355) 1, 2 (EC) [herein-
after Regulation 2320/2002], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:355:0001:0021:EN:PDF. 
 17 Council Regulation 300/2008, On Common Rules in the Field of Civil 
Aviation Security and Repealing Regulation (EC) No 2320/2002, 2008 O.J. (L 97) 72, 
72 (EC) [hereinafter Regulation 300/2008], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:097:0072:0084:EN:PDF. 
 18 Regulation 2320/2002, supra note 16, at Preamble. 
 19 See Regulation 300/2008, supra note 17, at Preamble (“It is desirable, in 
the interests of civil aviation security generally, to provide the basis for a common 
interpretation of Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation 
of 7 December 1944.”). 
 20 See Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 
1207–11, 15 U.N.T.S. 360–72 [hereinafter Chicago Convention], available at 
http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_orig.pdf.  For a more detailed 
history of the Chicago Convention and the work of the ICAO with respect to aviation 
security, see generally Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aviation Security: The Role of Law in 
the War Against Terrorism, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 649 (2002); see also R.I.R. 
Abeyratne, Some Recommendations for a New Legal and Regulatory Structure for the 
Management of the Offense of Unlawful Interference with Civil Aviation, 25 TRANSP. 
L.J. 115 (1998). 
 21 Annex 17, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., 
http://www2.icao.int/en/AVSEC/SFP/Pages/Annex17.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).  
Annex 17, entitled “Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Un-
lawful Interference,” has been amended several times including shortly after 9/11.  
Dempsey, supra note 20, at 677 n.140, 690. 
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sequent editions of Annex 17, the original version outlined its funda-
mental purpose in the preamble, declaring the following: 
 
the undersigned governments having agreed on certain princi-
ples and arrangements in order that international civil aviation may 
be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that international 
air transport services may be established on the basis of equality of 
opportunity and operated soundly and economically.
22
 
 
In accordance with this purpose, Regulation 2320/2002 set forth 
basic tenets to establish secure civil aviation programs.  The regula-
tion requires each EU member state to adopt a national civil aviation 
security program, a quality control program, and a training program.   
On the subject of passenger screening, section 4.1 of the Annex to 
Regulation 2320/2002 describes methods that EU member states must 
employ in order to satisfy the minimum security standards for air 
travel.  In short, passengers may be screened by hand or by using 
walk-through metal detection (WTMD) equipment.
23
  Passengers 
must be searched by hand if they trigger the WTMD alarm.
24
  Also, 
continuous random searches must be carried out for passengers who 
do not trigger the WTMD alarms.
25
  The regulation, however, does 
not require the use of X-ray equipment for passenger screening.  Alt-
hough the regulation provides the purpose and manner in which X-ray 
equipment should be operated, it only does so in the context of bag-
gage screening.
26
  It is also important to note that while section 4.1 
allows for screening by hand or WTMD, airports need not provide 
passengers with a choice of screening method.  In other words, air-
ports are not required to screen a passenger by hand if the passenger 
refuses to be scanned.
27
 
There are two provisions that form the basis for EU member states 
to deploy X-ray equipment specifically for screening passengers.  The 
first such provision can be found in Article 6 of Regulation (EC) 
300/2008.  Article 6 allows member states to “apply more stringent 
  
 22 Chicago Convention, supra note 20, at Preamble.  
 23 Regulation 2320/2002, supra note 16, at 4.1(1) (a)-(b). 
 24 Id. at 4.1(1)(b). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 4.3 (“Screening of Cabin Baggage”), 5.2 (“Screening of Hold Bag-
gage”), and 13.2 (“Standards and Testing Procedures for X-ray Equipment Applica-
bility”). 
 27 See Olga Mironenko, Body Scanners Versus Privacy and Data Protection, 
27 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 232, 236 (2011) (noting that UK government does not 
propose to provide alternative screening method for passengers who decline the 
security scanning method). 
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measures than the common basic standards referred to in Article 4.”28  
Article 6 clearly gives EU member states a great deal of discretion in 
employing methods that they feel will best enhance security.  The 
only limitation to this discretion is that in employing such methods, 
EU member states are required to “act on the basis of a risk assess-
ment and in compliance with Community law.  [The] measures shall 
be relevant, objective, non-discriminatory and proportional to the risk 
that is being addressed.”29  The regulation does not give further detail 
on the meaning of relevance, objectivity, nondiscrimination, or pro-
portionality beyond what is provided in Article 6. 
The other provision that allows EU member states to justify the 
use of X-ray technology for screening passengers can be found in 
Chapter 12.8 of the Annex to Regulation (EC) 185/2010.  Chapter 
12.8.1 provides that:  
 
A Member State may allow a method of screening using new 
technologies other than those laid down in this Regulation, provid-
ed that: (a) it is being used for the purpose of evaluating a new 
method of screening; and (b) it will not negatively affect the over-
all level of security being attained; and (c) appropriate information 
that a trial is being conducted shall be given to those affected, in-
cluding passengers. 
 
Chapter 12.8 is another area in the regulations that provides mem-
ber states some discretion in their use of security practices because the 
regulations recognize that screening technologies “will develop over 
time.”30  However, there are protocols that EU member states must 
comply with in order to test such technologies.  For instance, a mem-
ber state is required to provide written notification to the European 
Commission (EC) and member states, four months in advance of the 
use of any new technologies that are not specifically addressed by the 
regulations.
31
  The EC then has three months to approve the new tech-
nology that the member state intends to utilize.
32
  If the EC gives a 
positive reply or fails to respond within that three month period, the 
member state is authorized to use the technology for an evaluation 
  
 28 Regulation 300/2008, supra note 17, at art. 6(1). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Commission Regulation 185/2010, Laying Down Detailed Measures for 
the Implementation of the Common Basic Standards on Aviation Security, Preamble, 
2010 O.J (L 55) 1, 4 (EU), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:055:0001:0055:EN:PDF. 
 31 Id. at 12.8.2. 
 32 Id. at 12.8.3. 
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period that cannot exceed eighteen months.
33
  However, a twelve-
month extension may be granted if the member state provides ade-
quate justification.
34
  The EC retains the right to suspend the use of 
any new technology if it feels that the new screening method fails to 
provide adequate security.
35
  On September 5, 2008, the EC issued a 
draft regulation to the European Parliament and Council (EP) to de-
velop legislative screening requirements.  In response, the Parliament 
requested that the EC conduct an impact assessment in order to ad-
dress fundamental rights and health concerns raised by the use of se-
curity scanners.
36
  In formulating its assessment, the EC was asked to 
consult the European Data Protection Supervisor, the Article 29 
Working Party, and the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights,
37
 each of 
which had expressed reservations in 2009 about the use of security 
scanners.
38
  The EC agreed to conduct the impact assessment and 
dropped the provisions on security scanners from its legislative pro-
posal, which became Regulation (EC) 272/2009.
39
 
The EC issued a report on June 15, 2010, addressing the use of 
security scanners at EU airports.
40
  Many interpret the EC Communi-
cation as wholly endorsing the widespread use of security scanners 
across Europe.
41
  While the report seeks to address fundamental rights 
  
 33 Id. at 12.8.3, 12.8.4. 
 34 Id. at 12.8.4.  Commission Regulation (EU) 185/2010 does not allow 
evaluation periods to exceed 30 months.  Id. at 12.8.7. 
 35 Id. at 12.8.6. 
 36 See European Parliament Resolution of 23 October 2008 on the Impact of 
Aviation Security Measures and Body Scanners on Human Rights, Privacy, Personal 
Dignity and Data Protection. European Parliament, EUR. PARL. DOC. P6 
TA(2008)0521 (2008) [hereinafter EP Resolution of 23 October 2008]; Paul De Hert 
& Rocco Bellanova, Mobility Should Be Fun. A Consumer (Law) Perspective on 
Border Check Technology, 11 SCI. WORLD J. 490, 492 (2011). 
 37 See EP Resolution of 23 October 2008, supra note 37; De Hert & Bellano-
va, supra note 36, at 492. 
 38 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council on the Use of Security Scanners at EU Airports, at ¶ 31, COM (2010) 311 
final (June 15, 2010) [hereinafter EC Communication], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0311:FIN:EN:PDF. 
 39 Commission Regulation 272/2009, 2009 O.J (L 91) 7, 10 (EC), available 
at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:091:0007:0013:EN:PDF. 
 40 See generally EC Communication, supra note 38; De Hert & Bellanova, 
supra note 36, at 492. 
 41 See Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the 
‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
on the Use of Security Scanners at EU Airports,’ 2011 O.J. (C 107) 49, 50 [hereinaf-
ter EESC Opinion], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:107:0049:0052:EN:PDF  
(“[T]here are doubts as to whether the main objective of the legislative act in question 
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and health concerns, its primary goal is to steer the EU security scan-
ner policy away from the ad hoc basis it currently operates under and 
establish a clear legal framework for screening requirements and safe-
guards. 
A. Human Dignity, Privacy, and Data Protection 
 
In the process of standardizing security measures, the European 
Parliament and Council recognized the need to address human rights 
in general and civil liberties in particular.  Regulations 2320/2002 and 
300/2008 clearly observe and support the principles established by the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR).  Nevertheless, questions 
continue to be raised as to whether the use of security scanners at EU 
airports violates any provisions of the CFR or the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ECHR).  These instruments deal primarily 
with health, human dignity, privacy and data protection, and discrimi-
nation.  
1. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 
Those invoking the EU CFR typically reference human dignity 
(Article 1); respect for private and family life (Article 7); protection of 
personal data (Article 8); freedom of thought, conscience, and religion 
(Article 10); nondiscrimination (Article 21); the rights of the child 
(Article 24); and, ensuring a high level of human health protection in 
the definition and implementation of all EU policies and activities 
(Article 35). 
Article 1 on human dignity and Article 8 on the protection of per-
sonal data have been the primary source of ammunition for critics of 
security scanners.  Article 1 of the CFR declares, “[h]uman dignity is 
inviolable.  It must be respected and protected.”42  Article 8 provides 
the following:  
 
  
(the widespread introduction in all EU airports of ‘Security Scanners’ is the most 
suitable way to achieve maximum aviation security.”).  Cf. Sarah Ludford, European 
Commission is Fence-Sitting on Body Scanners, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (June 24, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/jun/24/european-
commission-fence-sitting-body-scanners (“I was expecting some strong conclusions 
rooted in a rigorous weighing up of pros, cons and costs. Instead we get a fig leaf of 
fence-sitting masking a firm intention to legitimize their EU-wide use.”).  For more 
on the EESC Opinion, see infra notes 86–103 and accompanying text. 
 42 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (C 
364) 9, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2000:364:0001:0022:EN:PDF. 
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1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data con-
cerning him or her.  
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes 
and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some 
other legitimate basis laid down by law.  Everyone has the right 
of access to data which has been collected concerning him or 
her, and the right to have it rectified.   
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an 
independent authority.
43
 
 
Using security scanners at airports has generated a great deal of 
controversy because the scanner technology allows systems to gener-
ate an image of the passenger without clothing.
44
  Some critics of se-
curity scanners maintain that the technology subjects passengers to 
“virtual strip searches,”45 while other commentators dismiss this char-
acterization as ridiculous and point out that there can be no nudity 
when no skin is featured in the virtual image.
46
  Nevertheless, the EC 
Communication concedes that security scanners have human dignity 
implications because use of the technology can “reveal a detailed dis-
play of the human body (even blurred) . . . and medical conditions, 
such as prostheses and diapers.”47  Moreover, there are Article 8 data 
protection
48
 concerns over the possibility that security personnel will 
have the ability to store these sensitive images. 
  
 43 Id. art. 8, at 10. 
 44 See BART ELIAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41502, CHANGES IN AIRPORT 
PASSENGER SCREENING TECHNOLOGIES AND PROCEDURES: FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS 5 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41502.pdf; 
see also EC Communication, supra note 38, at ¶¶ 32, 33 (“What are Security 
Scanners and what can be their role in aviation security.”). 
 45 ACLU Backgrounder on Body Scanners and “Virtual Strip Searches,” 
ACLU (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/aclu-
backgrounder-body-scanners-and-virtual-strip-searches. 
 46 Controlling When You Relieve Yourself, Not Body Scan, Invades Privacy, 
DENNIS PRAGER SHOW (Jan. 5, 2010), 
http://www.dennisprager.com/columns.aspx?g=5bf1740d-cd49-4815-a857-
bebbdd9e1a35&url=controlling_when_you_relieve_yourself,_not_body_scan,_invad
es_privacy. 
 47 EC Communication, supra note 38, at ¶ 50 (discussing “[t] he protection of 
human dignity.”); see Mironenko, supra note 27, at 236 (“The process reveals a per-
son’s gender and the precise construction of his or her body, together any usually 
concealed physical features that the ‘owner’ of the body in question may wish to 
conceal from strangers or even friends and family. Moreover, screening technologies 
are capable of revealing very sensitive areas of a person’s private life, medical aids 
and conditions, such as prostheses, breast implants, bras with gel pads, diapers, men-
strual pads, etc.”) (citation omitted). 
 48 See Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of 
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In light of these concerns, there are criteria against which the 
scanning should be assessed.  It must be determined (1) whether the 
measure proposed is appropriate to achieve the objective, (2) whether 
it goes beyond what is necessary to achieve this objective, and (3) 
whether there is less intrusive means of achieving the objective.
49
  
Limited use of security scanners seems to meet the criteria in this 
case.  The purpose of the scanners is to detect prohibited nonmetallic 
items that could pose a security threat.
50
  Critics contend that the 
method goes beyond what is necessary; however, there are limited 
ways in which security officials can effectively detect concealed 
nonmetallic items.
51
 
The EC Communication made a number of recommendations to 
address human dignity, data protection, and other fundamental rights 
concerns.
52
  The recommendations advocate reducing interaction be-
tween screener and passenger in order to make the process as anony-
mous as possible.
53
  Reviewers should not be able to see the passenger 
being screened, link the image to any person in any way, or store the 
image after the passenger has been cleared.
54
  Furthermore, only re-
viewers of the same gender as the passenger should conduct detailed 
reviews when necessary.
55
  The recommendations also mention the 
possibility of having mannequin or stick figure representations of the 
passenger,
56
 which seems to be where the technological trend is head-
ing due to the backlash over privacy and human dignity concerns.  
There are other technological innovations that may also mitigate 
privacy concerns.  For example, the EC Communication discusses the 
  
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40 
[hereinafter Directive 95/46/EC], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1995:281:0031:0050:EN:PDF. 
 49 See EC Communication, supra note 38, at ¶ 51 (addressing “[d]ata protec-
tion.”). 
 50 See ELIAS, supra note 44, at 2; see also How It Works: Advanced Imaging 
Technology, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., 
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/how_it_works.shtm (last visited Jan. 5, 2012) 
(“Advanced imaging technology safely screens passengers for metallic and nonmetal-
lic threats including weapons, explosives and other objects concealed under layers of 
clothing without physical contact to help TSA keep the traveling public safe.”). 
 51 See ELIAS, supra note 44, at 9–10; Mironenko, supra note 27, at 233. 
 52 See EC Communication, supra note 38, at ¶ 2.3 (addressing “[c]oncerns 
raised in relation to the use of Security Scanners at EU airports”). 
 53 See id. at ¶ 54 (outlining “[p]ossible ways to address the protection of 
human dignity, data protection and other fundamental rights concerns”). 
 54 See id. 
 55 See id. 
 56 See id. at ¶ 53. 
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use of Automatic Threat Recognition (ATR) software,
57
 which can be 
used to assist screeners in identifying threatening items or carry out 
interpretation functions automatically.
58
  The efficacy of ATR soft-
ware continues to be tested, but the EC believes that ATR software is 
ready for a trial in airports.
59
  
2. European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) of 1950 
 
Although the EC Communication and the majority of current 
opinions on security scanners address human dignity, privacy, and 
health concerns in the context of the EU CFR, it is still important to 
consider the ECHR.  It has a number of provisions
60
 that correspond 
with articles from the CFR.  In the context of security scanners, how-
ever, Article 8 is of particular importance.  The ECHR states that, 
“[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence.”61  Furthermore, the ECHR provides: 
 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of oth-
ers.
62
  
 
Interpreting Article 8 of the ECHR, especially in regard to securi-
ty scanners, is a difficult task.  Some scholars conclude that the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights applies a very broad interpretation of 
  
 57 See id. at ¶¶ 57, 58 (“ATR is based on specific software, designed to rec-
ognise dangerous and forbidden objects.”). 
 58 See id. at ¶57.  Screeners are assisted with the identification of threatening 
objects by “computer algorithms included within the screening protocol [that] allow 
for automatic identification of threat objects and anomalies instantly, at the time a 
passenger exits the portal.  If an anomaly is identified, a screener is alerted to provide 
secondary screening.”  Tim Hudson, Advanced Passenger Screening Technologies: 
‘It’s Not Just About the Passenger,’ 5 J. AIRPORT MGMT. 114, 121 (2011). 
 59 See EC Communication, supra note 38, at 13. 
 60 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20213/volume-213-I-2889-
English.pdf. 
 61 Id. at art. 8(1). 
 62 Id. at art. 8(2). 
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what Article 8 protects.
63
  The concept of private life can extend to a 
person’s body, social status, health, and a number of other personal 
identifiers.  Even if images are prevented from being stored, they are 
still collected and analyzed for an amount of time that is arguably 
sufficient to violate a passenger’s privacy.64  Yet these considerations 
must still be scrutinized under the exceptions provided by Article 
8(2).   
There have also been objections based on Article 8 of the ECHR 
because of the limited methods of screening offered to passengers.
65
  
As noted above, European airports are under no obligation to screen 
passengers by hand who refuse to partake in the security scanning 
method.  The UK government for instance, does not provide such an 
alternative.
66
  
B.       Standards and Effectiveness 
 
The issue of security scanner effectiveness has a direct conse-
quence on determining whether its use violates Article 8 of the EU 
CFR and Article 8 of the ECHR.  As mentioned above, the use of se-
curity scanners is not specifically regulated by the EU.  However, 
Article 6 of Regulation (EC) 300/2008 provides the basis for EU 
member states to apply more stringent security measures, which a 
number of European nations have done with the introduction of secu-
rity scanners.  Article 6 states that such measures are permissible if 
  
 63 See Mironenko, supra note 27, at 237 (discussing S and Marper v. United 
Kingdom, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1581; according to the court, “the concept of ‘private 
life,’” inter alia, “covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person; it can 
embrace multiple aspects of the person’s physical and social identity; elements such 
as gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life . . . .”  Id.  
 64 See id. at 241 (noting that scanners need to save the images for later in-
spection in the event that a scanner unit fails to detect contraband that is later used in 
terrorist attack).  Although security scanner manufacturers claim that the image stor-
age feature can be turned off at the customer’s request, which TSA claims to have 
done with the scanner units deployed, “these statements contradict the TSA’s own 
Procurement Specs which specifically require that the machines have the ability to 
record and transmit images, even if those features might be initially turned off on 
delivery.”  Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TRANSP. SECURITY, ADMIN., 
PROCUREMENT SPECIFICATION FOR WHOLE BODY IMAGER DEVICES FOR CHECKPOINT 
OPERATIONS, FINAL VERSION 1.02 (2008), available at 
http://epic.org/open_gov/foia/TSA_Procurement_Specs.pdf. 
 65 See Mironenko, supra note 27, at 236 (noting that the UK government 
does not offer an alternative method of screening for those who decline the security 
scanner method). 
 66 See id. 
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their use is “relevant, objective, non-discriminatory and proportional 
to the risk that is being addressed.”67 
Considering the fact that two terrorist attacks provided the prima-
ry impetus for using security scanners at airports,
68
 the appropriate 
question is whether security scanners actually could have prevented 
these attacks.  Such an inquiry can help determine whether the use of 
security scanners is in fact “relevant . . . and proportional to the risk 
that is being addressed.”69  
It is unclear whether security scanners would have detected the 
explosives used in either the attempt on al-Asiri or the Christmas Day 
Bombing by attempted by Abdulmutallab described above.
70
  In Ab-
dulmutallab’s case, security scanner manufacturers stated that the 
scanners “would not have detected the underwear bomb because it 
was in a light powdered form and the detonator was hidden in a body 
cavity.”71  Of course, the government’s continued use of the scanners 
suggests that they believe that the scanners are a useful tool.  Thus, 
the effectiveness of security scanners in addressing the threat to which 
they respond remains largely inconclusive.  There may be some cases 
where security scanners are able to detect explosives concealed on 
someone’s person, but explosives concealed in someone’s person re-
main an entirely different story.
72
  Independent researchers have af-
  
 67 Regulation 300/2008, supra note 17, at art. 6(1). 
 68 See Mironenko, supra note 27, at 233; see supra notes 6–15 and accompa-
nying text. 
 69 Regulation 300/2008, supra note 17, at art. 6(1). 
 70 See ELIAS, supra note 44, at 4 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-10-401T, BETTER USE OF TERRORIST WATCHLIST INFORMATION AND 
IMPROVEMENTS IN DEPLOYMENT OF PASSENGER CHECKPOINT TECHNOLOGIES COULD 
FURTHER STRENGTHEN SECURITY (2010)); Gardner, supra note 6; Mironenko, supra 
note 27, at 240 (noting that “neither millimeter-wave technology nor backscatters can 
detect explosives carried inside the body”); Spencer S. Hsu, GAO Says Airport Body 
Scanners May not Have Thwarted Christmas Day Bombing, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 
2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/03/17/AR2010031700649.html; U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-484T, TSA IS INCREASING PROCURMENT AND 
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY, BUT CHALLENGES TO THIS 
EFFORT AND OTHER AREAS OF AVIATION SECURITY REMAIN (2010) (“[I]t remains 
unclear whether the AIT would have detected the weapon used in the December 2009 
incident . . . .”). 
 71 Mironenko, supra note 27, at 240. 
 72 See id. (“[N]either millimeter-wave technology nor backscatters can detect 
explosives carried inside the body.”); Leon Kaufman & Joseph W. Carlson, An 
Evaluation of Airport X-ray Backscatter Units Based on Image Characteristics, 4 J. 
TRANSP. SECURITY 73, 73–74 (2011)\ (“The purpose of these is to find contraband 
hidden under clothing but on the surface of the traveler.”).  Pelle Neroth, 
Technologies to Read the Terrorist Mind, ENGINEERING & TECH. (Aug. 15, 2011), 
http://eandt.theiet.org/magazine/2011/08/beyond-body-scanners.cfm.  Body scanners 
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firmed this, stating that “[e]ven if exposure were to be increased sig-
nificantly, normal anatomy would make a dangerous amount of plastic 
explosive[s] with tapered edges difficult if not impossible to detect.”73  
This fact makes it more difficult to justify the use of security scanners 
under the relevant and proportional standards adopted by EU law. 
C. Health Concerns 
 
The EC urges EU member states to conduct their own risk as-
sessments in determining whether the use of non-ionizing or ionizing 
radiation is appropriate and justified.  The exposure to radiation 
caused by security scanners creates an obvious health concern.  Dif-
ferent security scanner systems use different technologies; thus, these 
health concerns must be considered on a system-by-system basis.
74
  
The EU Communication addresses the four primary technologies uti-
lized in security scanners: passive millimeter-wave imaging systems, 
active millimeter-wave imaging systems, X-ray backscatter, and X-
ray transmission imaging.
75
 
 
(1) The passive millimeter-wave imaging system does not 
emit any radiation.
76
  It measures thermal radiation emitted by the 
body and the environment.  Since this system does not emit any 
radiation dose, studies have concluded that it does not raise health 
concerns.
77
  
(2) The active millimeter-wave imaging system uses non-
ionizing radiation, which is generally considered less harmful than 
ionizing radiation (used in X-ray systems).
78
  While there is some 
radiation exposure, studies have suggested that the levels are equal 
  
have “been criticised for missing the items they are supposed to spot, due to the fact 
that the rays will not always penetrate thick folds of clothing. Neither can they 
penetrate skin, thereby missing bomb material that may be hidden inside body 
cavities.”  Id. 
 73 Kaufman & Carlson, supra note 72, at 73.  According to Kaufman and 
Carlson, a dangerous amount of PETN packed in a fashion similar to normal antomy 
could be missed by the scanners yet easily detected on pat down.  See id. at 93. 
 74 See Mironenko, supra note 27, at 233.   
 75 See EC Communication, supra note 38, at ¶ 35 (discussing the various 
technologies of security scanners that are commercially available). 
 76 See id. at ¶ 35(1) (describing “[p]assive millimetre-wave”) 
 77 See id.; see also id. at ¶ 61 (“The consulted studies do not raise health 
concerns when using passive millimetre wave technology.”). 
 78 See id. at ¶ 35(2) (discussing “[a]ctive millimetre-wave”).  Id. at ¶ 63 
(“Non-ionising radiation is generally considered not harmful compared to ionising 
radiation, such as X-rays.”). 
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to or less than “exposure levels arising from natural and everyday 
activities (e.g., mobile phones and microwaves).”79 
3) The X-ray backscatter system
80
 uses ionizing radiation and 
as such, is subject to the dose limits established by Euratom.
81
  
Although security scanners will expose passengers to ionizing ra-
diation, the dose is low.  The EC concluded that it would take ap-
proximately forty screenings per day for a passenger to reach the 
dose limit provided by Euratom.
82
 
4) The X-ray transmission imaging system emits a much high-
er dose than the backscatter system.  Therefore, transmission imag-
ing is not intended for systematic screening uses.
83
  X-ray trans-
mission screening is generally reserved for police purposes.  Due 
to the aforementioned risks and the availability of non-ionizing or 
low dose ionizing radiation systems, the transmission imaging sys-
tem is not used in Europe for aviation security.
84
  
 
On February 16, 2011, the European Economic and Social Com-
mittee (EESC) an important and powerful advisory body that repre-
sents civil society organizations across Europe, issued a very critical 
opinion on the 2008 EC Communication to the EP.
85
  While the EESC 
  
 79 Id. at ¶ 65 (citing the centre for Occupational Health and Safety, which 
measured the intensity of electromagnetic waves at 2 W/m2 (watt per square meter) 
the leak level for domestic ovens; this value is considerably lower than the 10 W/m2 
(50 W/m2) official power density exposure limit). 
 80 See generally Kaufman & Carlson, supra note 72 (discussing efficacy of 
x-ray backscatter machines for scanning airport passengers); George Zentai, X-ray 
Imaging for Homeland Security, 3 INT’L J. OF SIGNAL & IMAGING SYS. ENGINEERING 
13, 14–15 (2010) (discussing use of x-ray technology for luggage and packages). 
 81 See EC Communication, supra note 38, at ¶ 35(3) (discussing X-ray 
backscatter technology).  Id. at ¶ 66 (discussing health effects of X-ray backscatter 
technology); Council Directive 96/29, 1996 O.J. (L 159) 1, 7–9 (Euratom), available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/radioprotection/doc/legislation/9629_en.pdf. 
 82 See EC Communication, supra note 38, at ¶ 67. 
 83 See id. at ¶ 35(4) (discussing “X-ray transmission imaging” technology).  
Id. at ¶ 69 (discussing health effects of X-ray transmission imaging). 
 84 See id. at ¶ 70. 
 85 See EESC Opinion, supra note 41.  According to the EESC website: “The 
EESC contributes to strengthening the democratic legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
European Union by enabling civil society organisations from the Member States to 
express their views at European level. This Committee fulfils three key missions: 
 helping to ensure that European policies and legislation tie in better with eco-
nomic, social and civic circumstances on the ground, by assisting the Europe-
an Parliament, Council and European Commission, making use of EESC 
members’ experience and representativeness, dialogue and efforts to secure 
consensus serving the general interest; 
 promoting the development of a more participatory European Union which is 
more in touch with popular opinion, by acting as an institutional forum repre-
senting, informing, expressing the views of and securing dialogue with organ-
ised civil society; 
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does not wholly oppose the use of security scanners at EU airports, it 
stated that, “All in all, there are serious doubts, not as to the legality, 
but rather the legitimacy of the communication . . . the Commission 
should have taken far greater care when drawing up such a controver-
sial proposal.”86  The EESC even criticized the EC for using the term 
“security scanners,” as opposed to “body scanners,” which was the 
term previously used by the EP.
87
  The EESC claimed that the EC’s 
new terminology constitutes “an attempt to make the communication 
more politically attractive with a view to its adoption.”88 
Despite its criticisms of the EC Communication, the EESC’s res-
ervations primarily concern the extent to and manner in which the EC 
endorses the use of security scanners.  The EESC’s objections focus 
on (1) the lack of alternative screening methods offered to passen-
gers,
89
 (2) the legal justifications for exposing passengers to potential-
ly harmful doses of ionizing radiation,
90
 (3) concern that the EC has 
not conducted an adequate proportionality test that weighs the need to 
adopt the use of security scanners with other relevant factors,
91
 and (4) 
the EC’s suggestion that security scanners can replace existing meth-
ods of screening like searches by hand and WTMD.
92
 
The EESC insisted that legislation be introduced guaranteeing 
passengers the right to undergo alternative screening methods.  It stat-
ed that “passengers should be allowed to opt out of such checks and 
should always maintain the right to fly, regardless of the option they 
choose.”93  While the EC Communication does not rule out the idea of 
offering alternative screening methods to passengers, it does not force 
member states to do so.  Thus, the EESC opinion challenges the 
stance taken by the UK government, which does not require airports 
to offer passengers alternative methods after they have refused to be 
scanned.  Moreover, the EESC maintains that there should be legisla-
  
 promoting the values on which European integration is founded and advanc-
ing, in Europe and across the world, the cause of democracy and participatory 
democracy, as well as the role of civil society organisations.  
About the Committee, EUROPEAN ECON. & SOC. COMM., 
http://www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.about-the-committee (last visited Feb. 
20, 2012). 
 86 See EESC Opinion, supra note 41, at 3.8 – 3.8.2.   
 87 Id. at 3.7.1. 
 88 Id. at 1.2, 3.7.2. 
 89 Id. at 3.1.2, 3.6.1. 
 90 Id. at 3.6. 
 91 Id. at 3.1.2. 
 92 Id. at 3.7 – 3.7.6. 
 93 Id. at 1.2. 
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tion preventing airports from subjecting passengers to undue delays 
after they have refused scanning.
94
 
On the subject of health, the EESC urged the EC to provide con-
clusive studies on the health risks associated with the use of security 
scanners.
95
  As noted above, EU member states are bound by the Eur-
atom Treaty, which sets radiation dose exposure limits on an ad hoc 
basis.  Before exposing passengers to radiation, the appropriate au-
thorities must provide a legitimate justification and demonstrate that 
there are sufficient protective measures in place to ensure the lowest 
possible levels of exposure.   
The EESC opinion also noted that point 34 of the EC Communi-
cation suggests that scanners may replace existing methods of security 
screening, which the EESC argues is too narrow of an approach at a 
time when there are so many uncertainties as to the legality, technolo-
gy, health risks, and effectiveness of security scanners.
96
  The EESC 
therefore concluded, that, rather than try to expedite the use of securi-
ty scanners in as many EU airports as possible, “it would be more 
logical, given the fast-developing market, to wait for other technology 
that is more advanced, less intrusive and more in line with the objec-
tive to be achieved—namely, aviation security.”97   
The EESC urged the EC to establish a clear legal framework for 
including security scanners in the acceptable methods of screening.  In 
doing so, the EC must satisfy the standards provided by EU law.  Ac-
cording to the EESC, the EC Communication “does not appear to 
comply fully with the criteria of necessity, proportionality, and legali-
ty that must be displayed by any measure adopted by the public au-
thorities.”98  As to the principle of necessity, the EESC considers the 
link between the scanners and higher levels of security to be “tenu-
ous.”99  Regarding proportionality, the EESC urged the EC to weigh 
“the need for its adoption with other factors, such as the potential 
costs of setting up such security scanners.”100  Finally, in terms of 
legality, the EESC demanded that the EC address the concerns raised 
in regard to the CFR and the ECHR in a manner that creates a sense of 
clarity.
101
  The EESC noted that the “rights and freedoms most affect-
ed are almost exclusively those forming what the European Court of 
  
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 1.3, 3.5. 
 96 Id. at 3.7.3 – 3.7.6. 
 97 Id. at 3.1.2. 
 98 Id. at  3.2.   
 99 Id. at 3.2.1. 
 100 Id. at 3.1.2. 
 101 Id. at 1.2, 3.3.3 
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Human Rights considers the untouchable hard core of public policy 
established by the European Convention of Human Rights.”102  There-
fore, procedural safeguards must be put in place that protect the indi-
vidual rights of passengers, most notably in terms of human dignity, 
data protection, and health. 
On July 6, 2011, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a non-
binding resolution on the use of security scanners at airports in EU 
member states.
103
  In many ways, the EP resolution mirrors the sug-
gestions made in the EESC opinion.  The EP called on the EC to add 
security scanners to the list of authorized screening methods, under 
the condition that such authorization will be accompanied by mini-
mum standards and procedural safeguards.
104
  For instance, the EC 
must demonstrate that the use of security scanners will not “constitute 
a risk to passenger health, personal data, the individual dignity and 
privacy of passengers.”105  The EP recognizes that the majority of 
member states acknowledge that security scanners can contribute 
greatly to the goal of enhancing aviation security, particularly when it 
comes to nonmetallic and liquid explosives.  However, like the EESC 
opinion, the EP insisted that passengers should be able to opt out of 
the scanning process and participate in an alternative method.
106
  Fur-
thermore, passengers who refuse to be scanned should not be looked 
upon with a greater level of suspicion than those who submit to the 
scanning process.
107
 
In regard to health and privacy, the EP expressed confidence that 
technology can help alleviate these concerns.
108
  Nevertheless, it made 
clear that security scanners equipped with technology that uses ioniz-
ing radiation must be excluded from the list of acceptable screening 
methods.
109
  This would essentially preclude the use of X-ray 
backscatter and transmission imaging systems.  The EP Resolution 
also encouraged member states to continue testing the long-term ef-
  
 102 Id. at 3.3.3. 
 103 European Parliament Resolution of 6 July 2011 on Aviation Security, with 
a Special Focus on Security Scanners, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA-PROV(2011)0329 
(2011) [hereinafter EP Resolution of 6 July 2011], available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=
P7-TA-2011-0329. 
 104 Id. at ¶ 9. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at ¶ 20. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at ¶¶ 22, 24. 
 109 Id. at ¶ 23. 
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fects of radiation exposure while trying to develop scanning systems 
that have no harmful side effects.
110
 
This EP Resolution embodies a more positive view on the ability 
of technology to alleviate privacy concerns.  It explicitly stated that 
member states must ensure a random selection process for scanning 
passengers, body images must be limited to stick figures, data may 
only be used for the amount of time it takes to detect threatening 
items, and the data must be destroyed immediately after the passenger 
has passed through the screening checkpoint.
111
  In order to provide 
further assurances for these safeguards, security scanner use must 
remain consistent with Directive 95/46/EC
112
 on data protection.
113
  In 
addition, the EP member states should take steps to provide compre-
hensive information to passengers regarding the use of security scan-
ners.
114
  Lastly, the EP affirmed its commitment to end the ban on 
liquids in 2013, which should prompt member states to develop tech-
nology to address the carrying of liquids in order to ensure that the 
end of the ban does not compromise security.
115
   
The EP resolution provides insight into the future use of security 
scanners at European airports.  Notwithstanding provisions on human 
dignity, health, data protection and privacy rights, the EP still recom-
mended that the EC add security scanners to the list of authorized 
screening methods.  Taking this into consideration, it appears safe to 
say that security scanners will not be phased out at European airports 
anytime soon.  In all likelihood, the use of security scanners will in-
crease as the technology improves and helps alleviate human rights 
concerns.   
 
II.      THE UNITED STATES  
 
Shortly after 9/11, the United States took a number of steps to re-
organize executive agencies tasked with protecting the American pub-
  
 110 Id. at ¶ 25. 
 111 Id. at ¶¶ 27 – 29, 31 – 32. 
 112 See Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 48, at 38.  Directive 95/46/EC, com-
monly referred to as the Data Protection Directive, provides a regulatory framework 
for protecting personal information across all EU countries.  Id.  Article 29 of the 
Directive established the “Article 29 Working Party,” an independent advisory entity 
with representatives from each EU country tasked with examining questions and 
providing opinions regarding data protection and privacy.  See id., art. 29, 30 at 48; 
Mironenko, supra note 27, at 234 n.14; Article 29 Working Party, EUR. COMM’N 
DIRECTORATE-GEN’L FOR JUST., http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
 113 EP Resolution of 6 July 2011, supra note 103, at ¶ 33. 
 114 Id. at ¶¶ 35 – 36. 
 115 Id. at ¶¶ 42 – 44. 
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lic from the threat of terrorism.  The Aviation and Transportation Se-
curity Act of 2001 created the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA).  Originally part of the Department of Transportation, the TSA 
was later placed under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
a cabinet level department with a staff of more than 240,000 employ-
ees.
116
 
A. TSA and Whole Body Imaging/Advanced Imaging 
Technology 
 
In 2007, the TSA began deploying what are commonly referred to 
in the United States as Whole Body Imaging (WBI) or Advanced Im-
aging Technology (AIT) systems in airports across the United 
States.
117
  In a recent comment regarding this deployment, TSA ad-
ministrator John Pistole said, “‘[t]he terrorists keep adapting and 
evolving to try to defeat our security.’”118  These systems add an addi-
tional layer of security to address such threats.  There are currently 
488 WBI systems in use at seventy-eight U.S. airports.  In September 
2011 the TSA purchased 300 more millimeter-wave units and plans to 
implement WBI at an additional twenty-nine airports.
119
  The TSA 
uses both the millimeter-wave and X-ray backscatter systems,
120
 but it 
does not require passengers to submit to WBI screening.
121
  Passen-
gers who refuse to be scanned can receive alternative screening meth-
ods, such as a pat-down search.  Also, the TSA claims that images 
  
 116 About DHS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/about-
dhs (last visited Aug. 20, 2012); Our History, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., 
http://www.tsa.gov/research/tribute/history.shtm (last visited Aug. 20, 2012). 
 117 See Advanced Imaging Techonology: Innovation & Technology, TRANSP. 
SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/index.shtm (last visited Jan. 
6, 2012). 
 118 Ross Wilkers, TSA Boss: Patdowns, Scanners Work, EXECUTIVEGOV.COM 
(Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.executivegov.com/2011/08/tsa-boss-patdowns-scanners-
work/. 
 119 For a list of U.S. airports that currently have imaging technology systems, 
see Advanced Imaging Techonology: Frequently Asked Questions, TRANSP. SECURITY 
ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/faqs.shtm (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).  
See also Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin, TSA Announces Advanced Imaging 
Technology Deployments at U.S. Airports (Oct. 6, 2011), 
http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2011/1006.shtm. 
 120 See Frequently Asked Questions: Advanced Imaging Techonology, 
TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/faqs.shtm (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2012). 
 121 See id. (“[I]maging technology screening is optional for all passengers.”).  
See also ELIAS, supra note 45, at 1 (“If an individual considers this screening method 
too invasive or revealing or prefers not to undergo AIT imaging for any other reason, 
TSA provides the option of submitting to a pat-down search instead.”). 
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from WBI systems cannot be stored, printed, or transmitted and are 
immediately deleted after the passenger has passed through the securi-
ty checkpoint.
122
   
There are obvious differences between the legal approaches taken 
by the United States and Europe.  For instance, EU members have the 
added burden of trying to institute uniform procedures and regulations 
for a number of member states.  In contrast, the United States is prin-
cipally bound by internal laws, namely the Aviation and Transporta-
tion Security Act, and above all, by the Fourth Amendment.  
Just as in Europe, there are many critics of WBI in the United 
States, and many air travelers believe that the use of WBI is an inva-
sion of privacy.
123
  There have been a number of publicized cases 
where passengers and airline staff have been denied clearance at secu-
rity checkpoints after refusing to submit to scanning and the alterna-
tive pat-down search.  For example, on October 15, 2010, a pilot 
named Michael Roberts was prevented from passing through a securi-
ty checkpoint at Memphis International Airport.
124
  Although Roberts 
had passed through a WTMD without triggering the alarm, a TSA 
official informed him that he had to remove his shoes for WBI scan-
ning.
125
  Roberts refused the scanning and the official told him that as 
an opt-out, he would have to submit to a pat-down search or else he 
would not be allowed to pass through the checkpoint.
126
  Roberts 
again refused and was not allowed to pass through the checkpoint.  
The Rutherford Institute, a civil liberties organization that provides 
free legal services to individuals involved in constitutional disputes, 
has agreed to represent Roberts in making the case that WBI scanning 
constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
127
  Less than a 
  
 122 See Advanced Imaging Techonology: Privacy, TRANSP. SECURITY ADMIN., 
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/ait/privacy.shtm (last visited Jan. 6, 2012) (“Ad-
vanced imaging technology cannot store, print, transmit or save the image, and the 
image is automatically deleted from the system after it is cleared by the remotely 
located security officer.”).  Cf. Mironenko, supra note 27, at 241 (positing that images 
would need to be retained in the event screeners find a real terrorist or in the after-
math of a successful attack to see what went wrong). 
 123 See Agyemang Frimpong, Introduction of Full Body Image Scanners at 
the Airports: A Delicate Balance of Protecting Privacy and Ensuring National 
Security, 4 J. TRANSP. SECURITY 221, 223–25 (2011). 
 124 See Roberts v. Napolitano, 798 F. Supp. 2d 7, 9 (D.D.C. 2011); see also 
The Rutherford Institute Agrees to Represent Michael Roberts, Airline Pilot Who 
Refused to Submit to Virtual Strip Search, RUTHERFORD INST. (Oct. 21, 2010), 
https://www.rutherford.org/publications_resources/press_release_channel/The_Ruther
ford_Institute_Agrees_to_Represent_Michael_Roberts_Airline_Pilot/. 
 125 Id.  
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
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month later, on November 13, 2010, a passenger named John Tyner 
was prevented from passing through a security checkpoint at the San 
Diego Airport after he refused to submit to WBI scanning and the pat-
down search.
128
  There are a number of similarly publicized cases and 
there are bound to be many more given the intention of the TSA to 
increase the use of WBI scanning.
129
 
There have also been a number of legal and administrative dis-
putes between TSA/DHS and the Electronic Privacy Information Cen-
ter (EPIC).  In 2010, EPIC filed two requests to DHS under the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA).
130
  EPIC requested almost every 
  
 128 See Mironenko, supra note 27, at 233; Catherine Saillant, Traveler Who 
Resisted TSA Pat-down is Glad His Moment of Fame is Nearly Over, L.A. TIMES 
(Nov. 19, 2010),  http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/19/local/la-me-screening-tyner-
20101119. 
 129 In Durso v. Napolitano, 795 F. Supp. 2d 63, 65 (D.D.C. 2011), a com-
plaint filed on behalf of three airline passengers alleged screening methods violated 
their rights under the Fourth Amendment.  Durso, a recent breast cancer survivor who 
had undergone a mastectomy, alleged that TSA officials had inappropriately groped 
her.  Id.  Daniels, another of the complainants and a frequent business traveler, al-
leged to have been aggressively groped in his genital area when undergoing an en-
hanced pat-down search.  Id.  The third complainant, C.N., a twelve-year-old girl, was 
subjected to an AIT scan without the consent of her guardians.  Id. at 65–66.  The 
complaint was dismissed by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for 
lack of jurisdiction.  Id. at 73.  Represented by The Rutherford Institute, the plaintiffs 
along with pilot Roberts, filed a consolidated appeal in the D.C. Circuit.  See supra 
notes 124–27 and accompanying text.  See also Rutherford Institute Appeals Dismis-
sal of Airline Passenger, Pilot Lawsuit Against DHS & TSA Over Scanners, Virtual 
Strip Searches & Full-Body ‘Rub-Downs’, RUTHERFORD INST. (Jan. 3, 2012), 
https://www.rutherford.org/publications_resources/on_the_front_lines/rutherford_inst
itute_appeals_dismissal_of_airline_passenger_pilot_lawsuit_a.  In Tobey v. Napoli-
tano, No. 3:11CV154-HEH, 2011 WL 3841929, at *1-2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 30, 2011), 
prior to entering the AIT scanner unit, plaintiff removed his shirt revealing the text of 
the Fourth Amendment, which he had written on his chest with a marker.  Plaintiff 
was subsequently arrested by the police at Richmond International Airport and later 
filed suit alleging that defendants violated his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  Id. at *3.  The Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss 
all counts against TSA and DHS officials on the basis that plaintiff had failed to state 
a claim with sufficient specificity.  See id. at *18.  Finally, in Redfern v. Napolitano, 
No. 10-12048-DJC, 2011 WL 1750445, at *2 (D. Mass. 2011), plaintiff brought 
Fourth Amendment suit against TSA and DHS officials after being selected for AIT 
scanning on six different occasions, three of which he chose to opt out and was sub-
jected to the enhanced pat-down.  The complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion.  See id., at *8. 
 130 See Letter from Ginger P. McCall, Staff Counsel, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. 
(EPIC) to Mary Ellen Callahan, Chief Privacy Officer/Chief FOIA Officer, U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., RE: Freedom of Information Act Request and Request for 
Expedited Processing (July 13, 2010), available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/backscatter/Body_Scanner_Radiation_FOIA.pdf; see also 
Letter from Ginger P. McCall, Staff Counsel, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. (EPIC) to Kim-
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piece of information regarding WBI scanning that DHS had in its pos-
session.
131
  DHS released a large volume of documentation in re-
sponse, but withheld a number of images and several hundred pages 
of training manuals claiming that they were exempt from FOIA be-
cause they were internal materials and could constitute a threat to 
transportation security if released.
132
  In response, EPIC filed lawsuits 
in November 2009 and January 2010, seeking the release of the in-
formation that DHS withheld.
133
  After both parties filed motions for 
summary judgment, the District Court sided with DHS and allowed 
the documents to be withheld.
134
  On April 21, 2010, EPIC and thirty 
other organizations issued a petition to the TSA urging it to stop the 
use of WBI scanning.
135
  EPIC continues to argue that WBI scanning 
constitutes a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act, the Pri-
vacy Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Fourth 
Amendment.
136
 
On April 22, 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the 
“Aircraft Passenger Whole-Body Limitations Act of 2009,” which 
prevents the use of WBI as a primary screening method.
137
  Similar to 
the EESC, Congress was worried that the TSA might begin to rely too 
heavily on WBI and use it as a primary method in lieu of pat-down 
searches and WTMD.
138
  In fact, a bill introduced in the Senate in 
2010 attempted to do just that.
139
 The Securing Aircraft From Explo-
  
berly Walton, Special Counselor, Transp. Sec. Admin., RE: Freedom of Information 
Act Appeal on TSA10-0674 (Aug. 27, 2010), available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/body_scanners/Body_Scan_Rad_Appeal.pdf. 
 131 Letter from Ginger P. McCall to Mary Ellen Callahan, supra note 130. 
 132 For documentation released by the DHS, see generally Epic v. Department 
of Homeland Security – Body Scanners – Freedom of Information Act Documents, 
EPIC.ORG, http://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/backscatter/epic_v_dhs.html#foia  (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2012).  
 133 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 760 F. Supp. 2d 
4, 9 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 134 Id. at 14; see also Mironenko, supra note 27, at 234. 
 135 See Petition from Electronic Privacy Information Center et al. to Janet 
Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. & Mary Ellen Callahan, Chief Privacy 
Officer, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Apr. 21, 2010) available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/backscatter/petition_042110.pdf. 
 136 See id.; Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 
1, 5–11 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 137 See H.R. 2027, 111th Cong. §§ 1–2 (2009). 
 138 See id. at § 2 (“Whole-body imaging technology may not be used as the 
sole or primary method of screening a passenger under this section. Whole-body 
imaging technology may not be used to screen a passenger under this section unless 
another method of screening, such as metal detection, demonstrates cause for prevent-
ing such passenger from boarding an aircraft.”). 
 139 Securing Aircraft from Explosives Responsibly: Advanced Imaging 
Recognition Act of 2010 (SAFER AIR Act), S. 3536 111th Cong. § 4. 
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sives Responsibly: Advanced Imaging Recognition Act (SAFER AIR 
Act) would have mandated the deployment of WBI to airports across 
the country as the primary method of screening for the next two 
years.
140
  The bill, however, failed to gain traction and died at the 
committee level.
141
  Nevertheless, given the recent trend towards WBI 
systems combined with the TSA initiative to increase the deployment 
of WBI, more legislation will likely be introduced in Congress seek-
ing to make WBI systems the primary method of screening. 
 
B. The Fourth Amendment 
 
While European human rights protections against invasions of 
privacy rest on the principles of relevance, objectivity, nondiscrimina-
tion, and proportionality, privacy protections in the United States rest 
primarily on the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable 
searches.  The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon proba-
ble cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.
142
   
 
In order to trigger the protections of the Fourth Amendment, it 
first must be determined that the actions of the government or admin-
istrative agency amounted to a search or seizure.  Once it has been 
determined that a search was conducted, the inquiry then turns on 
whether the search was reasonable. 
The special needs doctrine constitutes an exception to the Warrant 
Clause requirement of standard Fourth Amendment searches.
143
  The 
special needs doctrine acknowledges that in some circumstances, in-
cluding administrative stops or inspections (e.g. systematic screenings 
required for transportation security), the probable cause standard un-
  
 140 Id. at § 3 (“It is the policy of the United States to aggressively seek, devel-
op, and deploy, in a timely fashion and in sufficient numbers, primary screening 
technologies capable of detecting and protecting against threats to domestic and inter-
national aviation travel that cannot be effectively and efficiently detected by other 
technologies currently more commonly utilized in airports, such as metal detection.”). 
 141 See Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009-2010), S.3536, LIBR. 
OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:s.03536 (last visited Jan. 
5, 2012). 
 142 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 143 See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
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der the Warrant Clause becomes impracticable.
144
  The justification 
for administrative stops and inspections remains a subject of debate.
145
  
While some legal scholars maintain that “inspections do not amount to 
a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment purposes,” others reason that “pas-
sengers ‘consent’ to the search when they purchase their tickets.”146  
Courts typically assess reasonableness on either an ad hoc basis or by 
applying a balancing test.
147
  That is, the individual’s Fourth Amend-
ment privacy rights are balanced against the societal interests at stake, 
which in this case include aviation security.   
The balancing test largely parallels the relevance and proportion-
ality tests applied by the EU in interpreting the CFR.  Therefore, while 
there are differences in terms of art, the main differences between the 
U nitedStates and European approaches relate to administrative, pro-
cedural, and legitimacy issues related to the propriety of using sys-
tems that may impact upon privacy.  The United States is bound by a 
number of Federal Acts, but principally by the Constitution.  Con-
versely, the EU consists of a collection of nations, which do not al-
ways see eye-to-eye on matters that have profound security and legal 
implications.  EU human rights laws on the use of security scanners 
consist of a variety of charters, conventions, resolutions, and regula-
tions that are interpreted differently and are given different weight by 
a number of committees, organizations, and agencies. 
C.        TSA Solutions 
 
TSA has taken steps to protect the rights of passengers while us-
ing enhanced security measures.  Although TSA continues to use WBI 
systems with ionizing radiation doses (which the EP resolution for-
bids), some of the changes being made are consistent with the requests 
in the EP resolution.  For instance, TSA announced that it will begin 
installing ATR software on all the millimeter-wave systems in use and 
begin testing similar software for X-ray backscatter systems.
148
  This 
  
 144 See M. Madison Taylor, Bending Broken Rules: The Fourth Amendment 
Implication of Full-Body Scanners in Preflight Screening, 52 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 
22–25 (2010); Stuart A. Hindman, Full-Body Scanners: TSA’s New “Optional” 
System for Airport Searches, 10 ISSUES AVIATION L. & POL’Y 337, 342–43 (2011).  
 145 MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: THE 
POLICE: CASES, STATUTES AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 108 (4th ed., 2011) (citing 
United States v. Hartwell, 296 F. Supp. 2d. 596, 602 (E.D. Pa. 2003), noting, “‘no 
consensus has been reached as to the grounds justifying’ an airport search”). 
 146 Id. 
 147 See Taylor, supra note 144, at 25, 27. 
 148 Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin, TSA Takes Next Steps to Further 
Enhance Passenger Privacy (July 20, 2011), 
http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2011/0720.shtm. 
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will eliminate “passenger-specific images” and replace them with the 
“stick figure” like images requested by the EP.149  Due to this change, 
the screen will no longer have to be hidden from the passenger and the 
reviewing TSA officer will not have to be in a remote viewing 
room.
150
  It seems clear that policymakers and airport authorities in 
the United States and Europe feel confident that technology can elim-
inate, or at least sufficiently mitigate, the legal concerns over the use 
of WBI technology for airport screening. 
CONCLUSION 
This essay explains the type of plots for which security scanners 
were implemented.  It describes the history of al-Qaeda’s attempts to 
use hidden explosives in attacks on government officials and civil 
aviation.  The piece explains how the European Union and the United 
States implemented measures aimed at protecting privacy, dignity, 
and individual liberty while balancing those values against the interest 
in protecting civil aviation from terrorist plots.   
The discussion suggests the following conclusions.  First, the se-
curity scanners and similar systems can, with advancements in tech-
nology, become more protective of privacy interests.  Specifically, as 
technology advances, some systems will also be developed which will 
allow the government to maximize its interest in security while also 
maximizing the citizenry’s interest in remaining free from excessive 
governmental intrusions into their private lives.  Second, there are 
obvious differences between the legal approaches taken by the United 
States and European nations (such as the fact that the EU has the add-
ed burden of trying to institute uniform procedures and regulations for 
a number of member states).  Despite these differences, both the EU 
and the United States have implemented similar air travel procedures 
to protecting passenger’s privacy rights.  Policymakers and airport 
authorities in the United States and Europe have proven that technolo-
gy can eliminate, or at least sufficiently mitigate, the legal concerns 
over the use of WBI technology for airport screening.    
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